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training through the Army professional military education system. As it is now implemented, the Army believes the CSF program has been successful, but some experts question the supporting research and contend that the program is not achieving the desired effects. Army CSF studies provide minimal evidence of success. An independent study of CSF is recommended and suggestions for changes in education, accountability and recruitment are offered to help ensure CSF is benefiting the Soldiers, unit readiness and the Army.
The United States Army Comprehensive Soldier Fitness: A Critical Look
These are the casualties of the spirit, the troubled in mind, men who are damaged emotionally. Born and bred in peace, educated to hate war, they were overnight plunged into sudden and terrible situations. Every man has his breaking point, and these, in the fulfillment of their duties as soldiers, were forced beyond the limit of human endurance. ability to cope with difficult or challenging personal, professional and familial situations and circumstances that accompany combat and multiple deployments. As it is now implemented, and based on several studies, the Army believes the CSF program has been successful, but some experts question the supporting research and contend that the program is not achieving the desired effects. This controversy demonstrates the need for additional research and analysis to determine the effectiveness of CSF and ensure that it is truly benefiting the Soldiers, unit readiness and the Army because the mental health of the force has strategic implications.
The nature of war has tested the endurance of Soldiers' resilience throughout history and no conflict has been immune to these injuries or their invisible scars. In the US military, combat stress has been recorded since the Civil War when it was referred to as a psychiatric condition known as Soldier's Heart and was characterized by 2 "sudden mood changes, heart palpitations, self-inflicted injuries, paralysis, tremors, and a longing to return home. The foundation of CSF is the ability of Soldiers to assess themselves using the GAT. This self assessment consists of an online survey of questions that probe a Soldier's personal perception and solicit self reported behaviors related to emotional, social, spiritual and family fitness. 9 Each of these dimensions is measured by weighing a number of associated attributes. Emotional fitness is defined by adaptability, good and bad coping, catastrophizing, character, depression and positive and negative effect.
Family fitness reviews family satisfaction and support. Social fitness uses friendship, loneliness and organizational trust. Spiritual fitness asks questions about how Soldiers conduct their life, which includes questions on spirituality, purpose and meaning of life, and whether or not they feel connected to humanity and the world.
Once the GAT is completed, Soldiers receive feedback via the online Army Fitness Tracker website. The information comes in a tabbed format that consists of the GAT score with a broad narrative, a tailored narrative and a comparison dashboard.
The Soldier's score is depicted using a bar chart for each of dimension (emotional, social, spiritual and family). Each bar is color coded in comparison to the mean score of other Soldiers' GAT scores. Green is above 50%, amber represents a score between 26% and 50%, and red is 25% and below. The broad narrative describes this methodology and how to interpret the data and provides any Soldier with a red score a hyperlink and phone number to connect with a counselor (See Table 2 There are significant problems with how these studies used data from GAT. In each study, GAT data was the primary source of data to evaluate individuals. In the third study, changes in a Soldier's GAT data in one or more dimension (emotional, social, spiritual and family) from one survey to the next was used to determine a Soldier's psychological fitness and whether the program was having an impact. While this data is useful in determining a Soldier's profile, the GAT itself may not be the right or appropriate tool in assessing the CSF program. According to one of the CSF psychologists, the GAT survey "captures a snap shot of a Soldier's mood in time" 13 and while the data may indicate a change, it does not explain how or if this change is related to the program.
After a review of the CSF program, Doctors Eidelson and Soldz criticized the Army's conclusions "there is now scientific evidence that CSF improves the resiliency and psychological fitness of Soldier's" 14 as being deeply flawed because they were based solely on the GAT, a self-assessment by soldiers that does not include validated measures of the program's effects on post traumatic stress disorder, depression, 9 suicides or psychological disorders. 15 Nor were the Army's conclusions based on any hard behavioral data. 16 Additionally, Eidelson and Soldz stated that "despite changes in GAT scores in several domains there is no evidence that these changes are associated with changes in functional mental outcomes" such as PTSD, depression and anxiety. 17 There is little evidence that improvement in a Soldier's GAT scores signifies any reduction in the incidence or likelihood of significant psychological distress. The lack of trust or buy-in is also evident when examining the usability or quality of the GAT survey. Army CSF studies report that 90% of Active, Guard and Reserve
Soldiers have participated in the GAT survey. 21 However, of that number, between 11%
and 16% stated that they did not provide accurate or quality information because they do not trust the process, suggesting that the actual percentage of useful participation may be well below 80%. 22 In collecting GAT survey data for the studies, researchers also had to account for a significant decrease in the number of useable surveys to 10 compare, which meant the study consisted of a small population than expected. In short, the data analysis suggests that not only is the program not reaching the intended audience, but that using the GAT data as a metric to evaluate the program is inherently problematic.
One of the most significant problems with using the GAT survey to study the CSF program's effectiveness is that in two of the four domains, family and spiritual fitness, there was no noticeable or identifiable change in the survey assessment over the course of the study. Moreover, the improvement in the domains of social and emotional from one survey to the next was less than 2% between the control group and treatment group (see Table 3 ). Eidelson and Soldz warn that "these results are even weaker when one considers the minimal associated effects sizes in the report and the experiment wise error involved in conducting many statistical significance tests without adjusting for the number of analyses." 23 The usefulness of the GAT also has to be questioned if Soldiers are not actively using the results to grow individually. One reason Soldiers might not be interested in or relate well to the CRMs is that online training is not for everyone. The Army Inspector General has said that one of the top ten complaints of Soldiers was that the Army has too much online training. They did not like that they were expected to do it on their personal computers and on their personal time. 27 The effectiveness of online learning has been widely studied in civilian and educational settings. For example, one company that launched an online training 13 program had a 50% attrition rate while another had an 80% attrition rate on their job related web-based training courses. Both companies found that the majority of people preferred the classroom experience when learning. 28 Another issue continually identified in studies of online training is the lack of incentives. These studies find that, without a tangible gain, most individuals are reluctant to or are not motivated to complete this online training during their personal time. 29 Researchers have found that online training can be a highly effective medium for a specific type of individual: the mature, selfdisciplined learner. The same research finds that online modules are an inappropriate learning environment for more dependent learners. 30 More important, is the response of Soldiers with lower GAT scores who are directed toward the CRM training. The first study states that there is a link between Soldiers with lower GAT scores and maladaptive behavior, which means that the completion rate among the targeted group might be impacted by the factors of personality, maturity and motivation. 31 Simply stated, Soldiers with lower GAT scores are more than likely lack the discipline to take or complete the CRM and the voluntary nature of CRM adds to this problem.
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Currently, participation in the module training is not mandatory and even if someone enrolls they are not held formally accountable for completing the modules. Another problem with the study is that the third report attributes any and all changes in the CSF dimensions (emotional, social, spiritual and family) and the associated sub-scales to the presence of and training by the MRTs (see Table 4 above). However, there is not a significant improvement or change in the GAT survey between the treatment and control groups during the study. Several leading psychologists and psychiatrists stated, "the findings do not seem to be very impressive." 37 This is apparent when looking at the numbers or small improvements:
.98% better coping skills, 1% more emotionally fit and .41% more adaptable in units with trainers (See Table 4 This skepticism becomes even more evident when an attempt is made to link MRT to changes in an individual's character. In the third Army study, researchers identified a decrease in the character in both the treatment and control groups. The decrease in the treatment group was less than the control group, -1.82 to 0.17 (see Table 4 ). Based on this finding, the researchers stated that "some evidence exists that MRT training may guard against natural rates of decline in character fitness." 43 While this hypothesis is interesting, it lacks evidence and fails to site a source or study where degrading character is a natural phenomenon. This statement is even more questionable based on the researchers' comments that "the study does not provide an explanation of which facts of the MRT training are responsible for impacting on the GAT score." 44 Finally, are the right individuals being selected to serve as the MRTs? Review of the selection criteria lists no pre-requisites, specific requirements, standards or considerations for candidates and therefore the unit chain of command is the sole determining factor in the selection process. 45 This means that the right individual may or may not be selected. Doctor Eidelson also questioned whether someone can be adequately prepared to teach this material after only ten days of instruction, stating that the study the MRT program is modeled after had better outcomes when administered by highly trained research staff rather than staffed with personnel recruited from the community. 46 This consideration raises doubts about how effective a non-commissioned officer can be after only ten days of training and virtually no experience in the field of positive psychology. 47 The third report also indicated that MRTs were only successful when they were confident with the material, the training was scheduled, and the 18 program was fully supported by the chain of command. 48 The Table 5 . Resilience Training Lifecycle: Institutional At this point, it is difficult to assess problems or issues associated with the institutional resiliency training pillar of CSF because it has only been in place for 18 months. Due to this limited amount of time, there is a lack of data and feedback to assess its impact or effectiveness. However, the three hours of instruction in the Warrior Leaders Course or the two hours in the Captains Career Course in Table 5 are examples of insufficient time allocated to achieve the intended objective of aiding in creating a culture of resiliency cross the Army. Additionally, the medium for most of this training is PowerPoint based instruction, 50 which may be less effective than an interactive or scenario based model. The Pre-Command Course CSF Overview (See Table 5 above) exemplifies why this training will not work or achieve the desired result.
The purpose of this training is to "apply an evidence-based, Soldier oriented resilience program for leaders to ensure mental fitness within their organization." 51 To achieve this 20 goal, the overview is allocated one hour and consists of thirty seven slides, which means that a little over one minute will be spent on each slide, leaving virtually no time for questions or discussions. This small amount of time and limited exposure to the material means that the overview will more than likely not achieve the intended purpose.
This point is even more significant because the audience consists of the commanders and sergeant majors that are responsible for the program's implementation and execution at the unit level. It also suggests that at a minimum, this pillar needs more research, analysis and participant feedback to determine its impact and value. Leaders must identify the metrics that will set the right conditions to promote fitness. situations. In addition to mental health screening the Army may also have to change how it educates and trains its recruiters so that they are better prepared to assist in screening recruits. However, until some kind of screening is in place, the Army needs to permanently do away with any and all waivers for psychological or behavioral related problems. The importance of this approach is apparent when reviewing the facts that 11% (>18,000/year) of recruits fail to complete initial entry training at a cost $75,000 per enlistee and a total of 30% fail to finish their first tour of duty. 61 While ensuring the best Soldiers are recruited the Army must also have leaders with the right skills.
CSF should not be a standalone program. The effective elements of building a more resilient individual should be integrated into the professional military education 24 system with a focus on the development and education of leaders at every level.
Properly trained, informed and educated leaders create the most effective learning environment for Soldiers; the experiential learning environment. Seamlessly and deliberately integrating resiliency training into this environment and making it an outcome of training could assist in creating a more resilient Soldier.
Conclusion
The psychological health of the force has strategic implications. From 2002 to 2009, the number of Soldiers who were non-deployable due to mental disorders increased from 7% to 39% and these numbers have only continued to rise. 62 By the end of 2012, the Army G-1 expected the total Army non-deployable rate to be as high as 16% with mental illness comprising a significant portion of that number. 63 The impact of these figures on manning, force generation and unit readiness is reflected in the Army's commitment to Comprehensive Soldier Fitness and its desire to reverse these trends.
However, in a time of dwindling budgets and constrained resources, the Army must demand that programs such as CSF are effective and producing measurable results. If not, Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, like many other well-intentioned programs will be perceived as nothing more than a signal that the Army is trying while in actuality wasting effort and consuming valuable resources and time. In the words of Sir Winston
Churchill, "however beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results." 
